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JUDICIAL TOLERANCE OF FARMERS' 
COOPERATIVES~ 
WALTON H. HAMILTON 
A decade and a half of judicial tolerance has been ended by 
a decision of the United States Supreme Court unfavorable to 
farmers' cooperative associations.1 A legislative act declaring 
the ginning of cotton to be a "public business" has been made to 
invalidate another act of the same legislature providing for the 
grantipg of permits to gin to cooperatives upon the petition o£ 
"one hundred citizens and taxpayers of the community." It is 
held by the Court that since the business is public, it cannot be 
entered without a lice~se; that in form and purpose the associa-
tion is a corporation; and that the legislative prescription of dif-
ferent conditions to individuals and "corporations" as a requisite 
for licenses is a denial of "the equal protection of the law" guar-
anteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The judgment of the Court 
is alike of immediate import and of future significance; it neces-
sitates the revision of tactics now employed in the conduct of 
cooperative associations; it may well lead to basic changes in 
the prevailing form of the organization or seriously retard the 
advance of the movement. An understanding of the meaning and 
import of the rule of law implicit in the decision demands a 
brief account of the ends, the forms, and the legal status of the 
cooperative association. 
The cooperative represents an attempt of the farmer to adjust 
himself to the ways of modern business. He is by trade, by 
habit,, and by tradition a producer rather than a bargainer, a 
husbandman rather than a trader. The necessity of taking his 
product to market, exacting the best price he can get, and pur-
chasing a living has been forced upon him by the march of 
unwilled events. The older America, save for a dotting of towns 
and an occasional city, was made up of quite-like; almost self-
sufficient, all-but-isolated farms. What was consumed by the 
household was for the most part raised on the place; whether a 
family was well or poorly off depended primarily upon hard 
work, skill, foresight, and the favor of the seasons; the family 
living ;was for the most part made rather than bought. But 
"science," the machine, and engineering converted an aggrega-
tion of small, homogeneous, industrial units into a great and 
* The writer acknowledges the invaluable assistance of Julius G. Dny, 
Jr., an editor of the Journal, in the preparation of this article. 
1 Frost v. Corporation Commissioners, 49 Sup. Ct. 235 (U. S. 1929), 
[936] 
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interlocking industrial system. Since a more efficient fanning 
demanded less labor, a surplus population left the farms for 
the city; since up-to-date agriculture gave a larger yield, surplus 
crops had to be marketed. Thus unwittingly the farmer who 
had been the bulwark of the agricultural regime was dragged 
into the commercial system; he came to produce "cash crops," 
to take his pay in "money," and to "buy the goods" on which 
his family lived. Whether or no, he was converted into a "busi-
ness man." 
But, from the first, the farmer has viewed with suspicion and 
hostility' "the business game." By his universal confession he 
has played it as a blundering amateur. With him, unlike mer-
chant and manufacturer, bargaining is recurrent rather than 
habitual; "for tlu.-ee hundred and sLxty days in the year the 
farmer has been a producer . . . then for a few days he sud-
denly becomes a trader." 2 The persons who are gainfully 
employed in agriculture are many, widely scattered, and person-
ally unacquainted with each other. The seller of cotton or wheat 
or fruits, skilled as he may be in petty dickering 'vith a neighbor 
or a stranger, has a feeling of impotence in facing alone "the 
market" and attempting tlu·ough intermediaries to negotiate 
with the unseen and unknown purchasers of his products. The 
ordinary farmer must sell when his crop is read~·; he has neither 
cash nor storage to enable him to await a more favorable season. 
Nor has he the technical knowledge or the sldll in forecasting 
to enable him to anticipate a favorable turn of the market. It 
is his ill luck that he takes the fruits of his labor to market just 
when his neighbors are taking theirs. It may be, of course, that 
the fam1er is relatively well off, that the ills of which he com-
plains are only those of other men or largely imaginary. It is 
probably true that no small part of them are due to an uncon-
trolled production which floods the market with surplus supply 
and depresses price. But the market is the point at which he 
comes into contact with the outside world and takes the shock. 
He knows, or thinks he knows, soils, crops, processes, and even 
the weather; but to him the increase and decrease in demand 
and the capricious ups-and-downs in price, the many conditions 
and causes of which lie at the ends of the earth, are veiled mys-
teries.3 He meets these "forces," which bountifully give or 
stingily withhold the good things of life, in the persons of those 
2 Meyer, The Law of CoCFperative Marketing (1927) 15 CALIF. L. REV. 
85, 94. 
3 With respect to the law of supply and demand, one writer has Enid 
"The farmers . . . found the movable factors in that law-time :md 
place; and they learned that the most important element in making price 
was • • • the ability to adjust supply to demand at any given time and 
place." Sapiro, The Law of Co-operat-ive Marlu::ting Associati1J71S (192G) 
15 KY. L. J. 1, 2. 
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with whom he bargains in the disposition of his crops. So the 
deficit between expectations and gains is due to middlemen, to 
the enormous costs which distribution eats up, to the pernicious-
ness or the inefficiency of the system of marketing.4 To the 
market, then, his troubles are due; to banish them, a new mar-
keting system must be devised. 
The attempt to hit upon a constructive solution of the market-
ing problem presents a long chapter in trial and error the end 
of which is not yet. If the farmers were to control, rather than 
to be controlled by, their market, a scheme for concerted action 
was necessary. A voluntary association was far too unstable 
and a business corporation far too alien to meet the needs of 
the community enterprise. It was essential to contrive a new 
type of "business unit" which would make easy the relations 
between association and members, give stability to the venture, 
and preserve its character as a "mutual benefit society." It 
chanced that several decades ago a group of consumers in an 
English town, intent upon protecting themselves against "the 
wastes" and the "extortions" of "middlemen" had banded them-
selves into a cooperative. The Rochdale scheme, 6 invented by 
a party on the other side of the market, was borrowed as the 
germ of the new agricultural organization. But urban England 
is not rural America, the needs of buyers are not those of sellers, 
and the acquisition of household necessities is not the disposition 
of staple crops; so the buyers' cooperative had to be converted 
into an institution which would serve the needs of producers.u 
For many years there has been experimentation in selecting, 
borrowing, adapting, contriving and fitting together devices, 
procedures, and arrangements into an organization that will 
meet passably well the peculiar demands upon it. In this process 
many elements of the business corporation have been adapted 
to the requirements of the cooperative venture. A current sur-
vey reveals great variety in the structure of the organization; 
a historical account points towards the emergence of a form 
which in outward appearance is a business corporation and in 
4 "When the World War ended • . • for the producers of agricul· 
tural products the prices were low, and there was no profit. To the con· 
sumer prices were so high that consumption was restricted. • • • Middle· 
men, speculators, and people who stood between the producers and con· 
sumers derived excessive profits from this situation, while the producers 
and laborers were denied a living ..•• " Clark, C. J. in Tobacco Growers 
Co-op. Ass'n v. Jones, 185 N. C. 265, 276, 117 S. E. 174, 179 (1923). 
5 FAY, COOPERATION AT HOME AND ABROAD (1925). 
s The cooperative movement has been judicially termed "the most hopeful 
movement ever inaugurated to obtain justice for and improve the financial 
condition of farmers and laborers." Tobacco Growers' Co-op. Ass'n v. 
Jones, supra note 4, at 277, 117 S. E. at 179. An estimate places the num· 
ber of cooperatives in existence in this country at 12,000 with a member· 
ship of 2,700,000. 
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end a mutual benefit society.7 But the accommodation of struc-
ture to function is not yet complete. 
In its attempt to find the proper form and to command sup-
port, the cooperative association has not had easy going. A 
morale has not been easy to maintain among scattered and inde-
pendent farmers; loyal supporters in days of their ovm need 
have been prone to break away when on occasion outside buyers 
were offering better prices; from the "inside" success has been 
constantly impeded by "forces" tending "to undermine the vital 
confidence and spirit of members." 8 From the outside the co-
operative has had to contend against the opposition of parties 
who have vested interests in the established institutions. If in 
time this form of association is to displace other marketing 
agencies, or to take a high place among them, it must be upon 
its proven merits. The legislature, by recognizing its peculiar 
form and approving its specific practices, can only accord it a 
chance of success in competition with rival organizations. The 
courts, a more delicate agency of control, can do no more than 
make a detailed accommodation of the law of the land to the 
exigencies of a developing type of organization. 
Almost from the first the farmers' cooperative has been 
looked upon with favor by the legislature. This has been due 
in part to practical politics; the farmers are numerous and have 
votes and their representatives are not unmoved by political con-
siderations. In part it rests upon a deeply seated conviction of 
"the unequal bargaining power of the agricultural class, in dis-
posing of its products and a feeling that an association of farm-
ers is not likely to be so comprehensive or so coercive as to 
threaten monopoly.9 In a series of acts Congress has exempted 
farmers' cooperatives from the income tax, 10 given them an 
immunity from the federal anti-trust statutes,11 and established 
1 A detailed history of the cooperative movement, of the forms which 
cooperative marketing has taken, and of the rea:;:on for its rllpid growth 
is to be found in STEEN, COOPERATIVE MARKETING (1923). 
s It is beyond the scope of this article to d~cribe these inside methods. 
They are briefly and clearly explained by Sapiro, op. cit. supra note 3. 
9 "There was no intention • • • to enable the producers to combine 
to sell their products at a profit beyond what would be a fair and reru:on-
able market price. Indeed, this would be impo:;:sible • • • as only a 
part of them would in any event belong to such an organization; ·whereas 
the manufacture of tobacco, being in comparatively a few hands, the buyers 
could combine as they have done for many year~, in a so-called 'gentle-
men's agreement' to fix the price. • • ." Clark, C. J. in Tobacco 
Growers Co-op. Ass'n v. Jones, supra note 4, at 272-273, 117 S. E. at 177. 
1o Revenue Act of 1926, § 231 (12), 44 STAT. 40 (1926), 2G U. S. C. § 982 
(1926). 
11 Section 6 of the Clayton Act, 38 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 17 
(1926) exempted agricultural associations "for the purpose of mutual help 
and not having capital stock"; this having been found UDEntisfactory, ns t!IO 
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a bureau in the Department of Agriculture to aid in their devel-
opment.12 With a surprising unanimity in end, if with a great 
variety in language, the legislatures of many states have con-
ferred upon the associations such favors as the enforcement of 
membership contracts by injunction, the recovery of liquidated 
damages for breaches of contracts by a member, a protection of 
contracts by appropriate penalties against interference from 
without, and immunity from prosecution under state anti-trust 
laws.:1.3 All in all more than forty states 14 have now adopted, 
with slight variations, the so-called Cooperative Marketing Act.10 
Nor have the courts been slow to follow where the legislature 
has led. The story of the development of the law of cooperative 
marketing has been set forth in clear-cut perspective and with 
colorfuJ. detail and cannot be repeated here.10 It is enough to 
say that the cases disclose a vast array of judicial utterance 
monotonous alike in judgment and in dicta. Almost without ex-
ception the opinions begin with a review of the oppressive con-
ditions with which the agricultural class is beset, discover 
cooperative marketing to be an appropriate means of relief, and 
conclude that the particular legislative proviso or cooperative 
practice which is in question in the case is a proper and valid 
means for promoting th.e larger end. It seems obvious that if 
cooperation is to be effective it must involve some departure 
from competition, exhibit some tendency towards monopoly,t1 
limited, the Capper-Volstead Act, 42 STAT. 388 (1922), 7 U. S. C. c, 12 
1 · (1926), included in the exemption organizations "with or without capital 
stock." 
12 Cooperative Marketing Act, 44 STAT. 802 (1926), 7 U. S. C. c. 18 
(1926). See also an act "to prevent discrimination against cooperative 
associations," 44 STAT. 1423 (1927). For comment on this federal legisla• 
tion, see NOURSE, THE LEGAL STATUS OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION' 
(1927)· c. XI. 
:1.s "In the space of five years, the legislatures and courts have mado 
greater progress in clarifying the rights, powers, and obligations of cooper• 
atives and their members than was accomplished in the first generation of 
ordinary corporation development. This is a tribute • • • to tho hope 
that in cooperative marketing may be found a partial solution of tho diffi• 
culties that beset the farmer.'' Sapiro, op. cit. supra note 3, at 20. 
14 Delaware alone is still entirely without statutory provision for tho 
creation of farmers' cooperatives. Vermont provides for them only by u 
section in her general corporation law. 
15 This model enabling legislation was drawn by Mr. Aaron Sapiro. For 
an excellent discussion of the legal status of these acts as passed by tho 
various states, see Tobriner, The Constitutionality of Cooperative Marlwt• 
ing Statutes (1928) 17 CALIF. L. REv. 19. A typical example of this legis· 
lation is the Bingham Cooperative Marketing Act of Kentucky. Ky. Acts 
1922, c. 1 • 
. 1o See NouRSE, op. cit. supra note 12. See also a report to tho Sonato 
by the Federal Trade Commission on Cooperative Marlceting (1928). 
:1.1 With reference to this feature, a writer has said: "The issue is ono 
which may be faced frankly. The commodity plan does contemplate com-
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and run some risk of being held to be "in restraint of trade." 
This serious hazard, which might well have resulted in a paraly-
sis of the movement, has been almost removed.18 Although in 
one state the threat remained as late as 1925, it seems clear that 
cooperative associations are now immune from ch..'l.llenge as be-
ing in themselves in restraint of trade.10 Although at first the 
courts were disposed to regard the special remedies, exceptions, 
and immunities conferred upon cooperatives by the legislature 
as unfair classification in violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment/0 it has of late been repeatedly held that such provisions 
are well within the discretion of the law-making body.:;1 Quite 
without exception the highest state courts have sustained the 
modity control, and it often leads directly into monopoly. The t::ooner that 
is generally understood, the better off co-operatives will be.'' Steen, op. cit. 
stwra note 7, at 306. 
1s Atkinson v. Colorado \\'heat Growers' Ass'n, 77 Colo. 559, 2:]8 Pac. 
1117 (1925). Other leading cases showing the early unfavorable attitude 
of the courts on this issue are: Ford v. Chicago l\lilk Shippers' Ass'n, 1GG 
Ill. 166, 39 N. E. 651 (1895); Reeves v. Decorah Farmers' Co-op. Society, 
160 Iowa 194, 140 N. W. 844 (1913) ; Georgia Fruit Exchange v. Turnip-
seed, 9 Ala. App. 123, 62 So. 542 (1913) ; Burns v. Wray Farmers' Grain 
Co., 65 Colo. 425, 176 Pac. 487 (1918). 
l.9 Neyer, op. cit. supra note 2, at 93; Dark Tobacco Growers' Co-op. A:::s'n 
v. Dunn, 150 Tenn. 614, 266 S. W. 308 (1924); Potter v. Darl;: Tobacco 
Growers' Co-op. Ass'n, 201 Ky. 441, 257 S. W. 33 (1923); List v. Burley 
Tobacco Growers' Co-op. Ass'n, 114 Ohio 361, 151 N. E. 471 (192G) ;; 
Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley Tobacco Growers' Co-op. li!arl{eting Ass'n, 
276 U. S. 71, 48 Sup. Ct. 291 (1928). Indicative of the change of attitude 
on the issue of restraint of trade are the words of the Minnesota court: 
"Subsequent to the World War • • • [the farmer's] condition was criti-
cal. The state, and in fact the government, responded to u sympathetic 
cooperation. in an economic rehabilitation of the stability of the agricul-
tural interest. The policy of our nation is apparent in exempting agricultural 
organizations, instituted for the purpose of mutual help • • • from the 
operation of the Sherman Act." 1\Iinn. Wheat Growers' Co-op. Ass'n v. 
Huggins, 162 1\Iinn. 471, 475, 203 N. W. 420, 422 (1925). 
20 The general attitude of the early decisions is e.;:pressed by the Supreme 
Court in the case of Union Sewer Pipe Co. v. Connolly, 184 U. S. 540, 5G3, 
22 Sup. Ct. 431, 441 (1902) : "If combinations of capital, skill, or nets 
• • • are hurtful to the public interests and should be suppressed, it is 
impossible to perceive why like combination in respect of agricultural prod-
ucts and livestock are not hurtful." And a lower federal court speal;:s 
to the same effect: "We are familiar with the duties of the farmer and 
the cares and trials of his business life, and appreciate highly the custom-
ary compliments paid by mankind to the rural yeomanry of the land • • • 
yet what is there about all that to entitle him to the prh•ilege of combin-
ing in restraint of trade • • • while • • • the storel•eeper and 
mechanic are precluded therefrom." In re Grice, 79 Fed. G27, 649 (C. C. 
N. D. Tex. 1897). 
21 N. Wisconsin Co-op. Tobacco Pool v. Bekkedal, 182 Wis. 571, 197 N. 
W. 936 (1923) ; Oregon Growers' Co-op. Ass'n v. Lentz, 107 Ore. 5Gl, 212 
Pac. 811 (1923) ; Clear Lake Co-op. LiYestock Shipper's A.ss'n v. Weir, 200 
Iowa 1293, 206 N. W. 297 (1925) ; Harrell v. Cane Growers' Co-op. A.ss'n, 
160 Ga. 30, 126 S. E. 531 (1925). 
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validity of the standard Cooperative Marketing Act; 22 and, 
through Mr. Justice McReynolds, speaking for the full bench, 
the United States Supreme Court has declared that "cooperative 
marketing statutes promote the common interest." 23 
Nor has a series of favorable decisions often been interrupted 
by an adverse judgment. A detailed search for overt practices 
which have been put under the judicial ban yields scanty results. 
In fact, earlier decisions and inconsequential points aside, one 
is driven largely to dicta for verbal evidence of an unfavorable 
attitude. "Secondary boycotts" are not to be permitted.24 It 
would be as much as its existence was worth for it to be proved 
that a cooperative had been formed for the sole purpose of man~ 
ipulating the market; 25 even the fixing of an "unduly" high 
price might constitute an adequate reason for its dissolution.20 
"Educational work" aiming at a restriction of production has 
been held legal; 27 but a threat of invalidity has been uttered 
against covenants among members to grow or not to grow n 
given crop at the discretion of the association.28 A trio of recent 
decisions insist that a strict compliance with statutory provi~ 
sions is a condition essential to the enjoyment of exceptional 
privileges.29 But such instances of disapproval and admonition 
indicate at most that there are limits of tolerance beyond which 
the cooperatives will not be permitted to go.30 
22 A few leading cases in addition to. those cited above are: Warren v. 
Alabama Farm Bureau Cotton Ass'n, 213 Ala. 61, 104 So. 264 (1925); 
Tobacco Growers' Co-op. Ass'n v. Jones, supra, note 4; Rifle Potato Grow-
ers' Co-op. Ass'n v. Smith, 78 Colo. 171, 240 Pac. 937 (1925). 
23 Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley Tobacco Growers' Cooperative Mar-
keting Ass'n, supra note 19. 
2~ United States v. King, 250 Fed. 908 (D. Mass. 1916). 
2s People v. Milk Exchange, 145 N.Y. 267, 39 N. E. 1062 (1895}. 
2s See Owen County Burley Tobacco Society v. Brumback, 128 Ky. 137, 
107 S. W. 710 (1908} ; Dark Tobacco Growers' Co-op. Ass'n v. Mason, 150 
Tenn. 228, 263 S. W. 60 (1924). 
21 List v. Burley Tobacco Growers' Co-op. Ass'n, supra note 19. Tho 
tendency towards limiting the supply occurs more naturally in the com-
modities, such as fruits or nuts, which require a long period of culture be--
fore being ready for marketing. 
28 Keegan, Power of Agricultural Co-operative Associations to Limit 
Production (1928) 26 MICH. L. REV. 648. 
29 Fisher v. El Paso Egg Producers' Ass'n, 278 S. W. 262 (Tex. 1925) 
(association held in restraint of trade, having operated for a year without 
attempt to come under the provisions of the state enabling act) ; American 
Livestock Commission Co. v. United States, 28 F. (2d) 63 (D. Okla. 1928) 
(cooperative not entitled to seek relief against boycott by market agencies 
at stockyards, since not authorized to handle products of non-members} ; 
McCauley v. Arkansas Rice Growers' Co-op. Ass'n, 171 Ark. 1155, 287 S. 
W. 419 (1926) (purchase of rice for profit by association held violation of 
contract with members as beyond scope of power) • 
3 0 For example, in Minn. Wheat Growers' Co-op. Marketing Ass'n v. 
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It is against such a background and into a smoothly running 
course of judicial approval that the unfavorable judgment in the 
F·rost case is projected. The case presents in epitome the whole 
problem of the struct01·e and function of the cooperative asso-
ciation and of its legal control. The question before the Court 
was a complex one; the issues discussed were numerous and 
badly tangled. The opinions are so grounded in the circum-
stances out of which the litigation grew that they are well nigh 
meaningless apart from a detailed knowledge of the facts. 
The beginning of the matter lies in a chapter of the legislative 
history of Oklahoma. It goes back nearly twenty years, to the 
days of "the new freedom" and "the new nationalism," to "the 
spirit of 1912," and the general belief that great political and 
industrial ills were to be cured by legislation. The good people 
of Oklahoma were not immune to the general dissatisfaction so 
prevalent throughout the cotton belt at the opening of the World 
War. To satisfy their demands, even if not to relieve their dis-
tress, two comprehensive statutes were passed by the legislature. 
The act of 1915 declared the ginning of cotton to be a "public 
business," 31 to be carried on only under a license from the Cor-
poration Commission. To those already engaged permits were 
to be given as a matter of course, but licenses for new gins were 
to issue only upon a sho·wi.ng of public necessity. This was to be 
Huggins, supra note 19, at 477, 203 N. W. 420 at 423: "We do not :::ay 
that this organization like any other corporation, association, or individual 
may not violate the law. It may. If so, it may be punished the :::ame as 
all others . • ~ who transgress.'' And to similar effect is the following 
from the Alabama court·: "If it should in the future appear • • • that 
this association is being used for unlawful purposes to the injury of the 
public interest, by creating a scarcity of cotton or by unrenEonably enhanc-
ing its market price, 'it will be the proper function of a court of equity to 
grant relief accordingly." Warren v. Alabama Farm Bureau Cotton Ass'n. 
supra note 22, at 66, 104 So. at 269. See also List v. Burley Tobacco 
Growers' Co-op. Ass'n, supra note 19; Washingt~n Cranberry Grower3' 
Ass'n v. Moore, 117 Wash. 430, 201 Pac. 773 (1921). It has been suggested 
that "the courts have been so swayed by emotions of sympathy with the 
farmer" as at times to compromise "the stricter form of judicial reason-
ing." NOURSE, op. cit. supra note 12, at 428. 
31 It is significant that the term employed is "public busineEs," not 
"public utility'' or business "affected with a public interest." It is doubt-
less true that at the time the ginning business was being overdone, and 
there was a demand for fewer and better gins. The act did provide for 
a regulation of charges; but there is no evidence to show that the legisla-
ture was willing to give up such protection as competition afforded the 
patrons of gins for a dubious trial at authoritative price regulation. On 
the contrary their intent was probably to make assurance half way sure 
by trying both methods. It is manifest that there is nothing inconsistent 
between licensing gins only upon a showing of neceEsity and a maintenance 
of competition between them. In short the term "public business" serves 
admirably when the intent is both to keep competition and to attempt price 
regulation. 
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attested by "the presentation of a petition signed by no less than 
:fifty farmer petitioners of 'the immediate vicinity." 82 The en-
abling act of 1917 made provision for the formation by persons 
engaged in agriculture or horticulture of cooperative associa .. 
tions without capital stock and not conducted for profit.aa In 
1919 this was amended to permit the formation of "corpora-
tions" with capital stock, but under legislative limitations de-
signed to preserve their features of "mutual benefit" and their 
cooperative character.34 In, 1923 "the petition of fifty farmer 
petitioners" was struck from the cotton ginning act as the test 
of public necessity,as and in 1925 there was inserted in lieu· of it 
the proviso, "that on the presentation of a petition for the estab-
lishment of a gin to be run cooperatively, signed by one hundred 
citizens and taxpayers of the community where the gin is to be 
located, the Corporation Commission shall issue a license for 
said gin." 86 
It is with the validity of these statutes and the rights under 
them that the case is concerned. Frost owned a ginning business 
in Durant; whether he was so engaged in 1915, or whether he 
secured his permit by a proper showing of "public necessity," 
the record does not disclose. The Durant Cooperative Gin Com-
pany was organized under the act of 1917 as amended in 1919; 
it presented to the Commission a petition signed by "one hun-
dred citizens and taxpayers" and asked for a license to establish 
a gin in Durant. Frost protested in writing that there was no 
"public necessity" for an additional gin. The Commission, hold-
ing the proviso relative to cooperative associations mandatory, 
refused to heed his request. Frost, alleging "the proviso" to be 
in violation of the "due process" and "the equal proteCtion of the 
laws" clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, brought suit for 
an injunction restraining the Commission from issuing the li-
cense. After a number of preliminary steps, 37 the federal dis-
trict court denied th~ prayer for relief.88 Upon appeal by Frost, 
the United States Supreme Court has reversed this judgment. 
The opinion of the court was delivered by Mr. Justice Suther-
land; there were vigorous dissents by Mr. Justice Brandeis and 
32 Okla. Laws 1915, c. 176, OKLA. COMP. STAT. (1921) §§ 3712-3718. 
83Jbid. § 5599. 
84Jbid. § 5637 et seq. 
asokla. Laws 1923, c. 191, OKLA. CoMP. STAT. (Supp. 1926) § 3713. 
36 Okla. Laws 1925, c. 109, OKLA. COMP. STAT. (Supp. 1926) § 3714. 
37 It is hardly necessary here to present in detail the course of tho litiga-
tion. A history of it is given in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justico 
Brandeis, Frost v. Corporation Commission, supra note 1, at 240-241. lt is 
enough to note that a preliminary question was passed upon by tho U. S. 
Supreme Court. Frost v. Corporation Commission, 274 U. S. 719, 47 Sup. 
Ct. 589 (1927). 
38 Frost v. Corporation Commission, 26 F. (2d) 508 (W. D. Okla. 1927). 
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1\:Ir. Justice Stone, in both of which 1\Ir. Justice Holmes joined. 
The opinion of the Court falls into two very distinct parts. The 
first, an offensive argument, is that "the proviso" which permits 
"corporations" to obtain licenses upon terms less exacting th.."l.n 
those prescribed for individuals is a denial of "the equal protec-
tion of the laws." The second, a defensive argument, is that 
there is no escape by way of proper legislative discretion, be-
cause cooperatives organized as business corporations are not 
valid subjects of classification. Each of these has its distinct 
significance for the cooperative movement. 
The argument by which the positive case is made out can be 
very briefly stated. In Oklahoma the ginning of cott-on is by 
legislative act a "public business," to be engaged in only under 
a "permit'' which is to issue only after "a sho·wing is made that 
such a plant is a needed utility." "It follows that the right t-o 
operate a gin and to collect tolls therefore • • . is not a mere 
license, but a franchise." It is "a right, p1ivilege, or power 
which by every legitimate test is a franchise." .:;l) "The right 
. . . is . . . exclusive against any person attempting to operate 
a gin without a permit . . . or against one who attempts to do 
so under a void permit." In either case "the owner may resort 
to a court of equity" for protection against "an injurious inva-
sion of his property rights." The license given to the Durant 
Cooperative Company is "void" ; it was obtained under "a pro-
viso" which is a "nullity"; because under it "a greater burden" 
is laid upon "an individual" who wishes to engage in the ginning 
of cotton than upon a cooperative association. Thus "the pro-
viso" is a denial of "the equal protection of the laws" guaranteed 
by the Fourteenth Amendment.~o 
The mere statement of the simple lines of this argument re-
veals the many difficulties with which it is beset. Like the 
minority of the court, many careful students will find themselves 
sorely puzzled by the course of the reasoning. In the words of 
the Oklahoma statute the ginning of cotton is declared to be a 
"public business," not a "public utility"; in the language of the 
legislature and of the state courts, 41 a "license" is only a license. 
It is true that in general public service industries are carried on 
under franchise.42 But if a "license" is a "franchise" in such 
s9 It is manifest that, although IIIr. Justice Sutherland is using the vo-
cabulary, his argument does not run in terms of the Hohfeld system. 
40 Frost v. Corporation Commission, supra note 1, at 237-238. 
41 Choctaw Cotton Oil Co. v. Corporation Commission, 121 Okla. 51, 247 
Pac. 390 (1926). 
42 To support the argument that in a "public business" a liceru:e is a 
franchise, IIIr. Justice Sutherland cites: Walla Walla v. Walla Walla 
Water Co., 172 U.S. 1, 19 Sup. Ct. 77 (1898); California v. Central Pacific 
R. R., 127 U. S. 1, 8 Sup. Ct. 1073 (1888) ; Monongahela Navigation Co, 
v. United States, 148 u; S. 312, 13 Sup. Ct. 622 (1893) ; Owensboro v. Cum-
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businesses as transportation, the supply of water, and the pro-
vision of telephone service, which are monopolistic in character, 
make use of public property, and are endowed with the right of 
emii~ent domain, it does not follow that a license is a franchise 
in the business of cotton ginning which is competitive in char-
acter, uses no public property, and is not endowed with the right 
of eminent domain.43 Even if it be admitted that the license is 
a franchise, it does not follow that it is exclusive, that the right 
which it confers is to be interpreted as a denial of a like right 
to another, or that the legislature may not modify or take away 
a "property" right which is of its own creation.44 The positions 
taken by Mr. Justice Sutherland are not without legal support; 
but it is significant that every one of the debatable issues has to 
be resolved in Frost's favor, or else his cause fails. 
Nor are the difficulties resolved by an attempt to discover the 
source bf the property right which is threatened by a license for 
a new gin. The ordinary businesses and callings are open to 
those who wish to enter them; the state can only prescribe rea-
sonable conditions upon which permits are to be had.4G If the 
ginning of cotton were an ordinary business, Frost's license 
would grant him no other right than to compete with other gin-
berland Telephone Co., 230 U. S. 58, 33 Sup. Ct. 988 (1913); Boise Wutor 
Co. v. Boise, 230 U. S. 84, 33 Sup. Ct. 997 (1913); McPhee & McGinnity 
Co. v. Union Pacific R. R., 158 Fed. 5 (C. C. A. 8th, 1907). 
43 In this case a great deal of attention is given to legislative classificn· 
tion; it invites study as an example of judicial classification. It is inter-
esting to note the things which the legislature distinguishes; it is of equal 
interest to observe the things which the court associates. It may be remem• 
bered that in a recent case the concept "brokerage" was used by the court to 
get the dealer in theatre' tickets and the employment agent in the same 
class. Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U. S. 350, 48 Sup. Ct. 545; see Comment 
(1928) 38 YALE L. J. 225. Here a like concept, not given a specific name, 
is used to get cotton gins in the class of railroads and water works. Some 
extreme critic is certain to insist that the logical principle underlying Mr. 
Justice Sutherland's reasoning is that what is true of all the members of 
a class is true of a member of a different class. 
H For judicial utterance upon the right of the state to grant, to modify, 
and to terminate a franchise right see: Louisville Bridge Co. v. United 
States, 242_U. S. 409, 37 Sup. Ct. 158 (1917); New Orleans Gas Co. v. 
Louisiana Light Co., 115 U. S. 650, 6 Sup. Ct. 252 (1885); New Orleans 
Waterworks Co. v. Rivers, 115 U. S. 674, 6 Sup. Ct. 273 (1885); Shallon· 
berger v. First State Bank, 219 U. S. 114, 31 Sup. Ct. 189 (1911); Dilling-
ham v. McLaughlin, 264 U.S. 370, 44 Sup. Ct. 362 (1924); Denver v. Now 
· York Trust Co., 229 U. S. 123, 33 Sup. Ct. 657 (1913). For a discussion 
of the legal character of "the certificate of convenience and necessity" see 
Lilienthal & Rosenbaum, Motor Carrier Regulation by Certificates of Nccr:s· 
sity and Convenience (1926) 36 YALE L. J. 163, 166-171. 
4G Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 
223 U. S. 59, 32 Sup. Ct. 192 (1912); Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 
161, 28 Sup. Ct. 277 (1908); Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 36 Sup. Ct. 
7 (1915). 
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ners for trade, and the application of the Durant Cooperative 
Company for a permit could not be refused. In that event the 
argument about a denial of "the equal protection of the laws" 
could not be validly raised. If Frost's rights are something 
more, or if a license is not easily to be had by the Durant Coop-
erative, it must be because the ginning of cotton is a public busi-
ness. But there is in its nature nothing to distinguish it from 
the milling of grain, the supply of credit, or the sale of fertil-
izers, upon all of which the farmers of Oklahoma are dependent, 
and all of which are open and competitive businesses. If legally 
it has been put in a distinct class it has been by act of the state 
legislature; 46 that the legislature has the power to divest the 
business of its public character does not seem to be denied.·n In 
last analysis the right of Frost, however broadly it may be inter-
preted, has its source in a legislative declaration Vlhich is 
admittedly subject to modification or repeal; the right of the Du-
rant Company to a permit rests upon the act of the same law-
------------------------------------------------------1--
46 To one familiar with the decisions of the present Court, the assump-
tion in the present case that because of legislative declaration the ginnir,g 
of cotton is a "public business" is a bit perplexing. If a "public busine:::s" 
is a distinct legal category, it would seem to lie between a business "af-
fected with a public interest" and a "public utility." The ginning of cot-
ton, a competitive industry, fails to meet even the criteria laid down for a 
business "affected with a public interest." "The business must be such 'as 
to justify the conclusion that it has been devoted to a public use and its 
use thereby, in effect, granted to the public.'" Mr. Justice Sutherland, in 
Ribnik v. McBride, supra note 43, at 355, 48 Sup. Ct. at 545. Moreover, 
"the mere declaration by the legislature that a particular kind of property 
or business is affected with a public interest is not conclusive upon the 
question of the validity of the regulation.'' Mr. Justice Sutherland, in Ty-
son & Bro. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 431, 47 Sup. Ct. 426, 428. 
47 It will perhaps help to clarify the matter to ask what the decision of 
the Court would have been had the validity of the legislative declaration 
that the ginning of cotton is a public business been raised. There were 
technical difficulties in the way of raising the issue in the instant case, into 
which it is here not profitable to go. But it might have been raised in a 
suit in which a person engaged in cotton ginning went into court ior pro-
tection against the authoritative regulation of his charges under the act 
of 1915. It is difficult to see, in view of the decision in the Ribnik case, 
how the statute could be upheld; for if employment agencies are not 
"affected with a public interest," surely cotton ginning is not a "public 
business" for purposes of price control. It might possibly be held to be 
such on the authority of Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (187G), and Cotting 
v. Kansas City Stock Yard Co., 183 U. S. 79, 22 Sup. Ct. 30 (1901), for 
it is easy to associate cotton gins with grain elevators and stock yards either 
by physical analogy or by a likeness in function. Such an association, need-
less to say, would not be based upon considerations relevant to the need 
for regulation and the appropriateness of its form, and it would do violence 
to outstanding differences between the industries. Grain elevators and 
stock yards which stand at "the great gateways of commerce" raise one 
problem of control, and cotton gins which plentifully dot the landscape quite 
another. 
HeinOnline  -- 38 Yale L. J. 948 1928-1929
948 YALE LAW JOURNAL 
making body~ The constitutional issue of "the equal protection 
of the laws" is evoked only by using the "public business" statute 
to invalidate the proviso which makes mandatory the granting 
of a permit to a cooperative association upon the petition of the 
"one hundred citizens and taxpayers." 48 It is difficult to see 
why of two rights, emanating from separate acts of the same 
legislature, one is valid and the other invalid. Many careful 
students of the case are likely to conclude with Mr. Justice 
Brandeis that the result is reached by a conversion of the right 
to gin into "a limited immunity from the competition" of other 
ginners.49 There is certain to be a respectable agreement with 
Mr. Justice Stone that inasmuch as Frost already had a license 
which was not an exclusive permit, .he had no "constitutional 
ground" on which to "complain of a discrimination from which 
he has not suffered." 50 
But of far greater importance is Mr. Justice Sutherland's de-
fensive argument. To those concerned with the cooperative 
movement the principal question is ahead; these issues which 
make up the main argument are mere preliminaries. The min-
ority of the Court insists that even if permits to gin are issued 
to individuals and to cooperatives upon different terms, there 
is' no denial of "equal protection of the laws," for such a distinc-
tion is "proper classification" and well within legislative discre-
tion. It is in attack and defense at this• point that the nature 
of the cooperative association, its social function, and the form 
of its organization receives judicial attention. 
The spokesman for the Court admits that a distinction rest-
ing "upon some ground of difference having a fair and substan-
tial relation ~o the object of the legislation" is valid. But he in-
sists that the distinction in question is "without any such basis" 
and "arbitrarily favors the corporation," i.e., the cooperative 
association, "as against the individual." He has "no reason to 
doubt" that a distinction between a private business and "an 
association for mutual help, without capital stock, not conducted 
for ·profit, and restricted to the business of its own members. 
. . . might properly be upheld." It chances, however, that the 
Durant Company "has capital stock . . . is allowed to do busi-
ness for others; to make profits and to declare dividends." In 
fact it is "in no sense a mutual association. Like its individual 
competitor it does business with the general public for the sole 
purpose of making money." So it is that "the proviso as here 
construed and applied boldly creates one rule for a natural per-
48 It is, of course, easy to interpret the legislation in such a way as to 
make the petition of "one hundred citizens and taxpayers" the 11showing" 
of public necessity. 
49 Frost v. Corporation Commission, supra note 1, at 241. 
so Ibid. 248. 
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son and a different and contrary rule for an artificial person." 
In short, without violence to the equal protection clause, a line 
cannot be drawn between business ventures and cooperative 
associations. The line must be drm-:m, if drav;'D. at all, betvteen 
individuals, corporations, and cooperative associations organized 
as corporations on one side and mutual benefit societies on the 
other.51 
The immeiliate impression made by this argument is the un-
certainty of its terms. It makes it quite impossiole to determine 
what legislative distinctions may and what may not "be properly 
upheld." It seems to be based upon the assumption that all co-
operatives fall into the two clear-cut and mutually exclusive 
groups of business corporations and mutual benefit societies. 
The criteria actually used are three in number, the use or non-
use of capital stock, the conduct of the venture for profit or not 
fm~ profit, and the doing of business or not doing of business 
for non-members. But an association may possess capital stock 
and not be run for profit, it may not possess capital stock and 
be run for profit; it may be run for profit and not serve non-
members, it may not be run for profit and serve non-members; 
in fact these different elements may be put together in various 
permutations. Nor are the meanings of the several terms clear 
beyond peradventure. A share of stock may confer upon its 
holder only a contingent right to a dividend; it may entitle him 
to a vote in the election of directors and carry no claim to a 
pecuniary income; it may combine a claim upon profits with a 
share of control in many different ways. An association may 
be organized to serve the pecuniary interests of its members and 
yet neither aim at profit nor pay out dividends. Profit and divi-
dends are technical terms and the forms that pecuniary gain may 
take are many and various. A cooperative society may not do 
business for non-members and yet have subsidiaries that do; 
there are many ways by which it can advance its interests by 
making use of outsiders without engaging in traffic with them 
directly. Most important of all, capital stock, profits, doing busi-
ness for outsiders, what not, are mechanical devices and pro-
cedures. They belong to the domain of form and structure; they 
tell little of the ends, the nature, the manner of doing business, 
or the worth of the enterp1ise in which they are employed. 
But, whatever the criteria employed, the clear-cut distinction 
of the opinion finds little support in the realities of cooperative 
organization. It is quite impossible to find a pure example of a 
mutual benefit society. It is a matter of common knowledge that 
farmers do not band themselves together for purposes of broth-
erly love alone; their end is to advance their material and pecun-
iary interests. It is only when the association loses its own 
61 Ibid. 238-239. 
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distinctive features that it becomes a business corporation. A 
careful study of cooperatives reveals a great variety in structure; 
in nearly all of them are to be found elements alike of voluntary 
cooperation and of business enterprise. Nor could it well have 
been otherwise. The end has been association for self-help; but 
the activities in which they engage are business activities; if 
they are to survive it must be in a world in which industries are 
under business control. Since their problems of financing, of 
marketing, of winning and holding patronage are much like those 
which every business must face it is almost inevitable that they 
should borrow the devices and procedures of business. The use 
of the corporate form simplifies the problem of organization and 
avoids many a complicating legal tangle. The issue of stock is 
a simple and obvious procedure for securing a necessary capi-
tal.52 The device of profits is a way of distributing the gains 
from the economies in marketing which it is the object of the 
association to effect. The service to non-members is a part of a 
policy for leading lukewarm individuals into the fold. But such 
elements of business as these are mere devices; their employ-
ment does not mean the exclusion of alternative arrangements; 
they may all be employed by a cooperative without any sacrifice 
of its purposes or character and without turning it into an ordi-
nary business corporation. 
In fact it is just this borrowing of the devices of business and 
the adaptation of them to the end of cooperation which has been 
going on. Neither capital stock, nor profits, nor service to out-
siders is incompatible with the establishment among constituent 
members of "economic democracy on lines of liberty, equality 
and fraternity." Where capital stock is used, the voting privi-
leges are not those of the business corporation; there is in use 
"the cooperative principle" of "one man, one vote." In the elec-
tion of directors the amount of the member's holdings avails him 
nothing. There are likewise restrictions on the transfer of stock 
certificates. In many cases shares held by non-patronizing mem-
bers carry fixed rates of return, confer no voting privileges, and 
partake in reality of the character of bonds. Where the device 
of profits is used, the rate of return is generally limited, in most 
s2 Such cooperatives as creameries, cheese 'industries, and grain elevator 
companies, etc. require more capital and in more concentrated, immediate 
amounts. 
As the proof is being read there comes to hand MONTGOMERY, THE Co~ 
OPERATIVE PATTERN IN COTTON (1929), a book which presents in clcarcut 
perspective and with fullness of detail the general situation out of which 
the Frost case emerges. It contains a graphic account of tho attempt to 
contrive a form of organization which will at once meet the farmers' need 
for mutual help and insure easy going in the world of business in which 
products have to be sold. It is unfortunate that the book came from tho 
press too late to be used in the preparation of this article. 
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cases to eight per cent; the disbursements to members is grad-
uated in terms of the amount of custom secured from each; and 
excess profits are apportioned to "an increase in capital," ap-
propriated to "educational or provident purposes," or distributed 
as "patronage dividends." Almost without e.'l\:ception, whether 
using or not using the, devices of capital stock and of profits, 
cooperative associations do business for outsiders.:;3 The Okla-
homa law, under which the Durant Cooperative was organized, 
imposes such limitations as these upon the use of business de-
vices by cooperatives. Thus the associations organized under 
state laws tend towards a common type, which is quite unlilte 
the commercial corporation. In a word "a new and different 
unit" for the doing of business has been in process of develop-
ment. 
In the development of this distinctive form of association the 
legislature and the judiciary have had their parts. In thirty-
three states acts provide for the limited use by associations of 
the devices of the business corporation.:;' It is of note that 
whereas exemption from prosecution was under the Clayton Act 
limited to associations organized for mutual benefit and without 
capital stock/5 by the Capper-Volstead act the immunity was ex-
tended to the new type of organization.50 The power of the state 
to promote the interests of farmers by appropriate legislation 
and to resort to classification for their especial benefit has been 
repeatedly recognized by the courts.57 In the Liberty Warehouse 
case :;s the United States Supreme Court dismissed the conten-
tion that the Bingham enabling act 50 was invalid under the Four-
teenth Amendment with the words, "it is impossible tb say that 
the legislature of Kentucky could not treat marketing contracts 
between the association and its members as of a separate class." 
The Burley Cooperative Association, a party to that suit, had no 
outstanding capital stock, but its subsidiaries engaged in ware-
housing were organized as corporations. In the opinion of the 
Court not a single case is cited in which a previous distinction 
:;a With" this account compare !l!r. Justice Brandeis' dissenting opinion, 
Frost v. Corporation Commission, supra note 1, at 243-247. 
54 See Mr. Justice Brandeis' opinion, ibid. 244, n. 12. 
55 38 STAT. 731, § 6 (1914) 15 U. S.C. § 17 (1926). 
56 42 STAT. 388 (1922), 7 U. S. C. c. 12 (1926). 
57 But Mr. Nourse had issued a warning that seems well-taken in the 
light of the instant case: "A scrutiny of the various judicial opinions 
shows clearly that the framing of co-operative statutes EO as to apply to 
a single class does raise an issue which, although it has been succe.ssiully 
fought out before many state courts, has presented to opponents of the 
co-operative system a promising line of attack." Nouns£, op. cit. supra 
note 12, at 413. 
58 Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley Tobacco Growers' Cooperative ~!ar­
keting Ass'n, su./pra note 19. 
59 See supra note 15. 
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had been made between cooperatives upon the basis of the use or 
non-use of some device or procedure of a business corporation. 
The most striking thing about Mr. Justice Sutherland's opinion 
is that the cooperative association is not recognized as a distinct 
business unit; it is lost in an over-simple and unreal separation 
of "corporations" from mutual benefit societies. 
It is evident that the decision in, the Frost case is of great 
signifiance; but, because of the uncertainty of the holding, it is 
indeed hazardous to attempt to reduce that significance to spe-
cific terms. An isolated rule, unbuttressed by precedents, and 
connected with the general body of law only by an attenuated 
train of argument, is always a disturbing thing. It is, perhaps, 
no fault of Mr. Justice Sutherland that he has not been able to 
fortify his conclusion by a less perplexing course of reasoning. 
The great jurists who have done creative work have frequently 
moved faster than they could bring up their reasons. The posi-
tions taken by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall are today regarded as 
generally sound; but his arguments are to many persons far 
from compelling. The future proved Mr. Chief Justice Taney 
sound in the Cha,rles River Bridge case, 60 but at the time he had 
only ~ vague appreciation of the doctrine of the police power 
which he used to reach his result. In declaring the Granger 
legislation valid,61 Mr. Chief Justice Waite gave a forward-look-
ing judgment; but his argument is not well put together and 
his handling of the concept of "public interest" by no means 
deft; the wrong-headed opinion of Mr. Justice Field is a far 
neater exhibition of dialectic. Like his distinguished prede-
cessors, Mr. Justice Sutherland's great virtue is in an ability to 
take a radical position; his fault is the fault of the innovator, 
who can do no more than his best in connecting a far-flung out-
post ·with the established domain of the law. It is to be expected 
that Mr. Justice Brandeis and Mr. Justice Stone, with their un-
willingness to depart too far from the course marked out by 
precedent, their sensitiveness to existing fact, and their respect 
for competition as an established social policy, would be able to 
muster the more sufficient reasons. But the merits of their 
opinions are those of sturdy conservative arguments. If the 
decision is perplexing and provoking it is because of the great 
hinterland which lies between former judicial utterance and the 
decision in this case. Until this is reduced to law and order the 
exact meaning of the judgment in the Frost case cannot be 
known. 
For that reason those who guide the cooperatives can in no cer-
tain way accommodate their policies to the most recent decision. 
So far as the holding and even the dicta go, though they cannot 
6o Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420 (U. S. 1837). 
61 Munn v. Tilinois, supra note 47. 
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certainly be distinguished, the situation can be met. Capital 
can be raised in other ways than by an issue of stock; gains can 
be disbursed, even if "profits" and "dividends" be under the ban; 
some device, such as associate membership, can be contrived to 
enable outsiders to be insiders for the purpose of doing business 
with the association. A cooperative corporation may be con-
verted into a non-stock, not-profit-making society without a 
sacrifice of current ends, methods, or procedures. The net 
effect of it all will be to force the association to use crude devices 
instead of effective ones, to employ circumlocution in place of 
straightforward action. Nor does the decision impose a serious 
barrier against those who would attack Frost's monopoly; the 
protection accorded his property right, which h..'ls its basis in a 
structural distinction between kinds of cooperatives, rests upon 
no secure foundation. Nor, so far as it affects entrance into an 
industry, does the decision of necessity force the cooperative as-
sociation to put off the form of a business corporation. The 
state legislature, by divesting the ginning of cotton of its public 
character, may permit farmers' associations to win for them-
selves whatever trade they can get in competition with any and 
all comers.62 But the abruptness with which this decision comes, 
its isolation from the general body of law, and its failure to 
recognize the cooperative association as a distinct form of or-
ganization indicate that there are judicial hazards ahead which 
are all the greater because they cannot be clearly foreseen. 
A judgment upon the measure of wisdom which the decision 
holds must be left to the course of events. But it is at least 
interesting to note in its wake some very curious things. A 
state attempts to reduce an unruly industry to order and suc-
ceeds in endowing with privileges individuals it sought to con-
trol. It is balked in an attempt to give cooperatives an oppor-
tunity to bring ginning under responsible direction by affecting 
the business with a public character. To sanction an e}.-periment 
designed to secure for an important industry the most suitable 
form of organization, it must divest the business of its public 
character. A legislative declaration that the ginning of cotton 
is a public business converts a right to compete into a limited 
62 It is hard to see how an act of the legislature divesting the ginning of 
cotton of its character of a public business could be directly challenged. 
Nor would the owner of a license granted under the statute repealed have 
an opportunity to bring suit to prevent the cancellation of his license; for 
the act of divestment would leave him secure in his right to compete. It 
is, of course, possible that claiming it to be a franchise, he might see!: pro-
tection for his "property right'' by asking the court in effect to declare the 
divesting act invalid. But, the instant case aside, no precedent in point 
has been discovered, and such an outcome seems unlikely. If it came to 
pass, the perpetuation of a host of such franchises would constitute an ironi-
cal memorial to ~ attempt at regulation which had failed. 
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immunity from competition. An individual has his conditional 
privilege to monopoly sanctioned by an invocation of "the equal 
protection of the laws." Some critic, unblessed with prophetic 
foresight, is sure to discover in· the case only the creation of 
property by a very mysterious process of law. 
